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SUMMARY
Despite a long history of referring to foreign law in its opinions, the United
States Supreme Court's recent citations to such sources have caused heated
controversy. Critics warn of threats to sovereignty as well as serious flaws in
the way judges use outside authority. Largely missing from this debate is any
probing examination of the actual practice of engaging with foreign
authorities. This Article attempts to fill the empirical void by analyzing
closely one court that has used foreign law extensively: the Constitutional
Court of South Africa.
The author conducted interviews with eight former and current justices1
who discussed both the value gained from the practice of engaging with
foreign law and their ways of addressing the concerns expressed by American
critics. Whether identifying universal norms, engaging in a dialogue to help
clarify an issue, or gaining insight into comparable constitutional provisions,
these justices see clear benefits from exploring the opinions of constitutional
courts in other parts of the world. Yet they approach such outside sources with
great care, fully aware of the potential hazards of transplanting foreign legal
concepts and conscientiously avoiding selective citation only to favorable
outside authorities. Detailed analysis is provided of several cases containing
significant references to foreign law, along with commentary from the justices
on how particular opinions were enriched by examination of other courts'
treatment of the same issues. These findings bear on the current debate and,
in a world where many other high courts engage in constitutional
comparativism, suggest that the United States Supreme Court would do well
by joining the conversation.
PERSPECTIVES
Well, I don't think that we should look to foreign law to interpret
our own Constitution .... I think the Framers would be stunned
by the idea that the Bill of Rights is to be interpreted by taking a
poll of the countries of the world.2
The author interviewed former Chief Justice Arthur Chaskalson; former Justices Laurie
Ackermann, Richard Goldstone, and Johann Kriegler; the current Deputy Chief Justice Dikgang
Moseneke; and current Justices Kate O'Regan, Albie Sachs, and Johann van der Westhuizen.
See infra note 5.
2 Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. to Be an Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before S. Comm. on the
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Judge (now Justice) Samuel A lito
While Congress, as a legislature, may wish to consider the
actions of other nations on any issue it likes, this Court's Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence should not impose foreign moods,
fads, or fashions on Americans.'
Justice Clarence Thomas
If here I have a human being called a judge in a different country
dealing with a similar problem, why don't I read what he says if
it's similar enough? Maybe I'll learn something.4
Justice Stephen Breyer
[U]nless one is at the height of one's arrogance, it must be so that
most legal issues are not of exclusive or immediate origin ....
Even in this country ... there's been judicial reasoning and
adjudication for at least two and a half centuries-and I think as
it is helpful to look at domestic jurisprudence, it must surely be
helpful to look at what other jurisdictions say .... '
Deputy Chief Justice Dikgang Moseneke
It would seem unduly parochial to consider that no guidance,
whether positive or negative, could be drawn from other legal
Judiciary, 109th Cong. 471 (2006) (response to Sen. Coburn's question), available at http://frw
ebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_senatehearings&docid=f:25429.wais
[hereinafter Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito].
3 Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 990, n.* (2002) (emphasis removed) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (citing Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 324-25 (2002) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting)).
' Debate on Foreign Law: Constitutional Relevance of Foreign Court Decision, Justices
Stephen Breyer and Antonin Scalia (Jan. 13, 2005) [hereinafter Debate on Foreign Law], available
at http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/ 1352357/posts.
5 Interview with Dikgang Moseneke, Deputy Chief Justice, Constitutional Court of S. Aft.,
in Johannesburg, S. Aft. (Mar. 5, 2007). The author conducted interviews with justices of the
court as follows: at Harvard Law School on February 13, 2007, former Justice Richard
Goldstone; at the Constitutional Court in Johannesburg, on February 20, former Justice Johann
Kriegler; on February 21, former Chief Justice Arthur Chaskalson; on February 22, Justice Albie
Sachs; on February 28, Justices Kate O'Regan and Johann van der Westhuizen; on March 5,
Deputy Chief Justice Dikgang Moseneke; and at the University of Cape Town, on March 19,
former Justice Laurie Ackermann. Audio tapes and transcriptions of the interviews quoted in
this Article are on file with the author.
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systems' grappling with issues similar to those with which we are
confronted.6
Justice Kate O'Regan
I. INTRODUCTION: THE CURRENT DEBATE
The United States Supreme Court's recent references to foreign law in
high-profile cases have prompted vehement objections, not only by some of the
dissenting justices,7 but by members of Congress8 and the academy.9 The
outcry generated by this topic is surprising given the long and generally
uncontroversial practice of looking to foreign law, both in United States
history'" and among the high courts of other countries in the world." So far,
6 K v Minister of Safety & Security 2005 (6) SA 419 (CC) at 437 (S. Aft.).
' The most visible airing of the issue occurred during the debate at American University
between Justices Breyer and Scalia. Colloquy, The Relevance of Foreign Legal Materials in
U.S. Constitutional Cases: A Conversation Between Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Stephen
Breyer, 3 INT'L J. CONST. L. 519, 519 (2005); see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 598
(2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 624-28 (2005) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 990 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring).
8 Several bills are pending that would prohibit any federal court from using decisions of
foreign countries in interpreting the Constitution. E.g., American Justice for American Citizens
Act, H.R. 1658, 109th Cong. § 3 (2005); Constitution Restoration Act of 2005, H.R. 1070, 109th
Cong. § 201 (2005). During the confirmation hearings for Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Alito, some senators also made clear their objections to the practice of looking to foreign law.
E.g., Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be the Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th
Cong. 42 (2005) (statement of Sen. John Comyn) [hereinafter Hearing on Nomination of John
G. Roberts], available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/senate/judiciary/sh 109-158/brow
se.html (follow S. Hrg. 109-158); Hearing on the Nomination of SamuelA. Alito, supra note 2;
infra note 52.
9 E.g., Robert J. Delahunty & John Yoo, Against Foreign Law, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 291,296 (2005); Donald J. Kochan, Sovereignty and the American Courts at the Cocktail
Party of International Law: The Dangers of Domestic Judicial Invocations of Foreign and
International Law, 29 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 507, 508-09 (2006); Ernesto J. Sanchez, A Case
Against Judicial Internationalism, 38 CONN. L. REV. 185, 188-90 (2005).
1" See Daniel A. Farber, The Supreme Court, the Law of Nations, and Citations of Foreign
Law: The Lessons of History, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1335, 1336-37 (2007); Paul Finkelnan, Foreign
Law andAmerican Constitutional Interpretation: A Long and Venerable Tradition, 63 N.Y.U.
ANN. SuRv. Am. L. 29,32-33 (2007); David J. Seipp, The Role of the Judge in the Twenty-First
Century: Our Law, Their Law, History, and the Citation of Foreign Law, 86 B.U. L.
REv. 1417, 1429-33 (2006).
" See Mark C. Rahdert, Comparative Constitutional Advocacy, 56 AM. U. L.
REV. 553, 660-61 (2007); Diarmuid F. O'Scannlain, What Role Should Foreign Practice and
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the discussion has largely avoided any in-depth analysis of exactly what courts
do when they consult foreign authorities. The purpose of this Article is to start
to fill that gap.
Objections to the consideration of foreign law in constitutional adjudication
seem to fall into two main categories. First, as a matter of jurisprudential
philosophy, some see constitutions as, by their nature, tied closely to the
particular nation's history, culture, and, indeed, its very identity.'2 The
originalists in this country are perhaps the best example, but even those who
do not subscribe strictly to the notion of original intent see a potential danger
of diluting the essence of a nation's charter with foreign influences. 3 The
premise here is that the foreign law will have a substantive effect on domestic
law in a way that is inappropriate and even potentially threatening to national
sovereignty.
The second type of criticism focuses primarily on methodology. Critics
challenge the way in which courts use outside sources. How do courts decide
where to look? Are they not simply "cherry picking," that is searching for an
authority that supports their own view while ignoring contrary opinions? And
finally, skeptics question whether ideas from other countries can be
successfully transplanted in light of the difficulties of understanding other
legal systems, 4 particularly when another language is involved.
Some of the critics appear at times to have a political agenda. Professor
John Yoo's view, for example, that the United States should pay little or no
attention to the opinion of the rest of the world" surely reflects an ideology
more than a jurisprudential approach to constitutional decision making. Yet,
Precedent Play in the Interpretation ofDomestic Law?, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1893, 1894-96
(2005).12 See, e.g., Sanchez, supra note 9 (discussing the connection between history, culture,
identity, and the Constitution).
" See, e.g., Kochan, supra note 9, at 512 (expressing concern over "outside sources
[piercing] the boundaries of domestic law").
" See, e.g., Philip D. Racusin, Comment, Looking at the Constitution Through World-
Colored Glasses: The Supreme Court's Use of Transnational Law in Constitutional
Adjudication, 28 Hous. J. INT'LL. 913,942-44 (2006) (discussing difficulties in understanding
foreign legal systems).
15 See Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 9, at 296-97. Professor Yoo became well known for
American exceptionalism as one of the authors of the so-called torture memo authorizing
extreme interrogations techniques. See Mark Mazzetti, '03 US. Memo Approved Harsh
Interrogations, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 2, 2008, at Al.
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the controversy has been the focus of several academic symposia 6 and
attracted commentary from a broad array of constitutional scholars. 7
In an effort to shed an empirical light on the debate, and to assess the
significance of the objections raised, this Article looks closely at one court
that, since its creation fourteen years ago, has had extensive experience
working with foreign materials: the Constitutional Court of South Africa. In
Part 1I, the Article sets forth the context in which the court works and describes
the value that its members see in looking abroad when confronting
constitutional issues. Part III focuses specifically on criticisms that have been
leveled at such a comparative approach. First, it confronts the claim that
consulting foreign authorities exerts an unwarranted influence on substantive
domestic law, thereby potentially undermining a nation's sovereignty. This
claim arises from a common misconception about the comparative approach,
namely that the interpretation found in the foreign source exerts precedential,
or at least persuasive, force on the domestic court. The South African court's
engagement with foreign law does not, however, treat such sources as
16 See Symposium, "Outsourcing Authority?" Citation To Foreign Court Precedent In
Domestic Jurisprudence, 69 ALB. L. REV. 645 (2006); Symposium, International Law and the
State of the Constitution: The Twenty-Fifth Annual National Student Federalist Society
Symposium on Law and Public Policy--2006, Foreign And International Law Sources In
Domestic Constitutional Interpretation, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 173 (2006); Symposium,
To What Extent Should the Interpretation andApplication of Provisions of the U.S. Constitution
Be lnformedby Rulings ofForeign andInternational Tribunals, 26 U. HAW. L. REV. 335 (2004).
17 See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, Essay, The Rise of World Constitutionalism, 83 VA. L.
REV. 771 (1997); Roger P. Alford, In Search of a Theory for Constitutional Comparativism, 52
UCLA L. REV. 639 (2005); James Allan & Grant Huscroft, ConstitutionalRights ComingHome
to Roost? Rights Internationalism in American Courts, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1 (2006); Diane
Marie Amann, International Law and Rehnquist-Era Reversals, 94 GEO. L.J. 1319 (2006);
Steven G. Calabresi & Stephanie Dotson Zimdahl, The Supreme Court and Foreign Sources of
Law: Two Hundred Years of Practice and the Juvenile Death Penalty Decision, 47 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 743 (2005); David Fontana, Refined Comparativism in Constitutional Law, 49
UCLA L. REV. 539 (2001); David C. Gray, Why Justice Scalia Should be a Constitutional
Comparativist... Sometimes, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1249 (2007); Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutions
as "Living Trees "? Comparative Constitutional Law and Interpretive Metaphors, 75 FORDHAM
L. REV. 921 (2006); Harold Hongju Koh, The Globalization of Freedom, 26 YALE J. INT'L
L. 305 (2001); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., "I'd Like to Teach the World to Sing (in Perfect
Harmony) ": International Judicial Dialogue and the Muses-Reflections on the Perils and the
Promise of International Judicial Dialogue, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1321 (2006); Judith Resnik,
Law's Migration: American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and Federalism's Multiple Ports
ofEntry, 115 YALE L.J. 1564 (2006); Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Global Community of Courts, 44
HARV. INT'L L.J. 191 (2003).
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"authority," even in the broadest sense of the term.18 Indeed, a striking aspect
of this treatment of foreign law is its extensive use of dissenting opinions,
particularly when looking to cases from the United States. Obviously, the
substantive law is not what matters, but rather the reasoning at work in
confronting a common problem or issue.' 9 The Article then goes on to address
three commonly raised methodological issues. It describes how the South
African court decides what jurisdictions to consider, confronts the charge of
"cherry picking," and discusses the potential pitfalls involved in interpreting
foreign law. Finally, Part IV analyzes in detail several areas in which the
South African court has referred extensively to foreign law in an attempt to
see, in concrete settings, whether the methodology used is in fact as sound and
unproblematic as the justices suggest.
II. THE VALUE OF COMPARATIVISM
One of the goals of this study was to learn as much as possible, through
interviews with justices and examination of their opinions, about the benefits
to be gained from using the law of other countries. As is always true when
taking a comparative view, it is important first to understand the institution
being studied. Creation of the Constitutional Court was a critical component
of South Africa's transformation from the apartheid parliamentary regime to
a representative constitutional democracy. This court was entrusted with the
responsibility of ensuring the broadest possible enforcement of the rights
enshrined in the new constitution by all branches of government, and, indeed,
by private persons as well.2° After considerable debate and negotiation, it was
determined that a new court should be created, unburdened by the
discrimination that had characterized society, and the judiciary, in the past.
That court, along with all other courts and tribunals, was explicitly instructed
by the constitution that, when interpreting the Bill of Rights, it "must consider
18 See Frederick Schauer, Authority andAuthorities, 94 VA. L. REV. 1931, 1935-41 (2008).
'9 IfAmerican justices finding themselves in dissent saw how their views might be attractive,
if not to their colleagues, then to courts in other parts of the world, perhaps they would be less
hesitant about referring to foreign sources.
2 The final Constitution of South Africa provides that provisions of the Bill of Rights bind,
not only all branches of the government, but natural or juristic persons to the extent that the
provision may be applicable given the nature of the right and the duties imposed. S. AFR.
CONST. 1996 § 8(1)- (2). The interim constitution had been interpreted as providing for indirect
horizontal application of the Bill of Rights through development of the common law. See Du
Plessis v de Klerk 1996 (3) SA 850 (CC) (S. Afr.).
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international law' I and it "may consider foreign law. 22 Deputy Chief Justice
Dikgang Moseneke, who had himself spent ten years in the infamous Robben
Island prison after a conviction at age fifteen for anti-apartheid activity,
described these unusual provisions as a "bold move" 23 on the part of a country
that had been isolated from the world during the apartheid era, a pariah kept
from participating in development of the law around the world.
Conforming to this image of a court open to ideas from all around the globe
is the structure of the court itself. The building is airy, light, and colorful,
while also retaining reminders of the dark history that gave it birth.24 The
building, which opened in 2004,25 combines modem architecture with pieces
of a century-old prison that had formerly occupied the site. Among many
others, Mahatma Gandhi and Nelson Mandela spent time here awaiting their
trials. The courtroom where oral arguments are held is also open and
welcoming. Despite its location below street level, the room is filled with
natural light shining through skylights and a long narrow window offering a
view of the feet of pedestrians passing by. This was a deliberate touch by the
architects to ensure that a glimpse of ordinary citizens will penetrate the court
proceedings, as well as to convey the truth that people appear much the same
if you see them only up to their ankles.2 6
The Constitutional Court of South Africa has issued more than 300
judgments over the past fourteen years, of which more than half cited to
foreign law.27 While in some cases the foreign law references were tangential
and perhaps even incidental, in more than a third of the judgments the court
grappled extensively with the opinions of courts in other jurisdictions.28
21 S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 39(1)(b). The original interim constitution of 1993 contained
similar provisions. See S. AFR. (Interim) CONST. 1993 § 35(1).
22 S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 39(1)(c).
23 Interview with Deputy Chief Justice Moseneke, supra note 5.
24 The court's website provides a walth of fascinating details about the process of designing
and building this new court. Constitutional Court of South Africa, http://www.constitutionalco
urt.org.za (last visited Feb. 27, 2009).
25 Until then the Court operated temporarily in bare office space in Johannesburg.
BRONWYN LAw-VIuOEN, LIGHT ON A HILL: BUILDING THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF SOUTH
AFRICA 7 (2007).
26 See id. at 73 (quoting Justice Albie Sachs).
27 A chart categorizing all the opinions by subject matter, procedural posture, and extent of
foreign references is on file with the author.
28 The characteristics of the judgments that contained no references to foreign law are such
that looking to foreign law would not have been helpful: nearly half of these opinions did not
include a discussion of the merits, almost a third dealt with questions of appellate procedure, and
about a quarter involved the adjudication of local structural disputes, such as political
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Before turning to the judgments rendered by this court, three preliminary
remarks are perhaps in order. As may well have occurred to the reader,
modem constitutions, such as that adopted in South Africa in the 1990s, were
inevitably influenced by the many constitutions and charters that preceded
them. When establishing the new constitutional order, the South African
framers had the benefit of experience around the world in other open and
democratic societies that value freedom and equality. They deliberately
borrowed structures and procedures to help ensure that the kind of society they
envisioned would be fostered and protected.29 When the Constitutional Court
certified the final constitution, it explained, for example, that the notion of
separation of powers was important in many countries, and that the South
African version was consistent with what Justice Frankfurter had described in
the Steel Seizure case.3 ° With regard to a Bill of Rights, South Africa
borrowed heavily from Canada in first establishing the fundamental rights of
individual persons and then providing a limitations clause to set criteria for
situations when those rights may be infringed for the benefit of society.31
Given these historical facts, it is surely natural for the interpretation of that
constitution to take a global perspective in a way that may not be called for in
the United States. Nonetheless, the following description of the South African
experience will show that a dialogue among the world's courts can bring
valuable perspectives, regardless of historical context.
Second, the South African court, a newly created entity in a country whose
experience with judicial review had been modeled on the British parliamentary
system, giving courts only limited power to ensure compliance with applicable
procedures and enforce common law protections of individual rights until
Parliament stepped in,32 seemingly had little choice but to look elsewhere for
apportionment. See supra note 27.
29 See, e.g., Franmois du Bois & Daniel Visser, The Influence of Foreign Law in South
Africa, 13 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBs. 593, 625-33 (2003) (discussing the use of
Canadian and German precedents in drafting the South African Bill of Rights and the use of the
United States' varying levels ofjudicial scrutiny in providing a framework for interpreting those
rights).
30 Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In Re Certification of the
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC) at 809-11 (S. Afr.). The
South African court appreciated Justice Frankfurter's observation that the areas controlled by
the three branches of government "are partly interacting, not wholly disjointed." Id. at 810
(citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1951)).
3' Interview with Albie Sachs, Justice, Constitutional Court of S. Afr., in Johannesburg, S.
Afr. (Feb. 22, 2007); see du Bois & Visser, supra note 29, at 633, 635-37.
32 See lAIN CURRIE & JOHAN DE WAAL, THE BILL OF RIGHTS HANDBOOK 2-4 (5th ed. 2005)
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precedents, at least initially. Some of the justices suggested that the tendency
to refer to foreignjurisprudence might decrease with time, as the court not only
developed its own precedents, but gained confidence in its constitutional
adjudication.33 And indeed, the frequency of the court's foreign references
does appear to have diminished somewhat over the past twelve years.34 Yet,
none predicted that the court would stop looking to foreign sources, and the
value they saw in the enterprise suggests that most of the justices will continue
the practice. Accordingly, the fact that American judges are working with an
older document and with a set of established precedents does not negate the
benefits to be gained from comparative jurisprudence.
Finally, the South African court had a strong incentive to look to other
democracies in light of its recent history as a pariah state. After noting that
under apartheid international and foreign law were seen as a kind of refuge, a
place to find standards higher than the ordinary law defined by Parliament,
Justice Johann van der Westhuizen explained:
By the time the Constitution was drafted, we were very much in
the mood of becoming part of the world, because we had been
isolated for a long time, and therefore people were quite eager to
link up firstly with international law to prompt the government to
comply with its obligations, and then with the specific reference
in the Bill of Rights to foreign law.35
(noting three earlier South African constitutions were not significantly different from ordinary
acts of Parliament, and of course Parliament's status as "representative" of the people was
severely undermined by its election by the white minority). "If there ever was a constitutional
mismatch, it was the application of the British doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty to the
racially-divided South African state." Id. at 4.
" Interview with Richard Goldstone, Justice, Constitutional Court of S. Afr., in Cambridge,
Mass. (Feb. 13, 2007); Interview with Johann Kriegler, Justice, Constitutional Court of S. Af'.,
in Johannesburg, S. Afr. (Feb. 20, 2007).
14 In the Court's first four years, 1995-1998, over sixty-eight percent of its 101 judgments
contained references to foreign law, and most of these were significant references. In the next
four years,just over forty-four percent of the Court's eighty-eight judgments included references
to foreign law, but only about half of these were significant references. Since 2003, the Court
has issued 111 judgments: forty-three percent of these included references to foreign law. See
supra note 27.
15 Interview with Johann van der Westhuizen, Justice, Constitutional Court of S. Afr., in
Johannesburg, S. Afr. (Feb. 28, 2007). Margaret Burnham has similarly pointed out that the
South African court's use of comparative jurisprudence helped it to claim its place among
modem democracies. See Margaret A. Burnham, Cultivating a Seedling Charter: South Africa s
Court Grows Its Constitution, 3 MICH. J. RACE & L. 29, 44 (1997).
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Justice Johann Kriegler echoed the same theme, noting that in light of the
country's history of isolation, "being aware of what is happening in the
mainstream out there is important .... [W]e think we were left behind in
many ways. 36
In this regard, American judges do not have a comparable incentive. Yet,
while few would describe the United States today as a pariah state, post-
September 11 developments have sharply reduced this country's stature as the
beacon of liberty among the nations of the world. Several of the South African
justices lamented these developments, expressing great sadness that America
no longer stands firmly against all forms of oppression and torture. For
example, Justice Richard Goldstone, who had interrupted his tenure on the
South African court to serve as chief prosecutor of the United Nations
International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia,
regretted that courts could no longer look to the United States in evaluating the
constitutionality of practices, such as rendition and enhanced interrogation
techniques, used against detainees." Justices Arthur Chaskalson and Kate
O'Regan expressed similar sentiments, noting their sorrow that the United
States, long a key champion for human rights, no longer stood firmly by its
principles.3" To the extent that this country's reputation has suffered in the
ways described by these justices, perhaps it could regain its former prominence
and respect by joining in the global conversation.
In some of its judgments, the South African court has set forth its
appreciation that the constitution encourages regard for foreign law. For
36 Interview with Justice Kriegler, supra note 33.
3 Interview with Justice Goldstone, supra note 33; see also Richard J. Goldstone, Justice
of the Constitutional Court of South Africa, Speech at the J. Byron McCormick Lecture, The
Consequences of the United States Abdicating Its Moral and Political Leadership of the Free
World (Sept. 10, 2007), in 24 ARIz. J. INT'L & CoMp. L. 587, 596 (2007) (discussing the United
States recent "disregard for fundamental human rights" at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay).
" Justice Chaskalson commented that the United States, once a bulwark for human rights,
has failed to sign on to many international agreements protecting fundamental rights, except for
those related to protecting its economic interests abroad. He noted that this may well be related
to the reluctance of American courts to look to foreign and international law. Interview with
Arthur Chaskalson, Former Chief Justice, Constitutional Court of S. Afr., in Johannesburg, S.
Afr. (Feb. 21, 2007). In response to a question about whether the court is looking for a baseline
of human rights, Justice O'Regan first gave her view that, indeed, international conventions,
often without the support of the United States, have established certain basic civil and political
rights, as well as economic and social rights. She then expressed sadness that, given its record
at Guantanamo, the United States has wavered even more in its commitment to human rights.




example, in a 2005 case involving the question of whether the minister of
police should be held vicariously liable for the gross misconduct of three
members of the Johannesburg police department, the court engaged in an
extensive discussion of authorities from the United Kingdom, Canada, and the
United States.39 The court, in a unanimous judgment authored by Justice
O'Regan (the youngest member of the court with experience as a law professor
and scholar), explained its reference to such foreign sources:
[I]t is not only our law that has struggled to determine the proper
ambit of the principles of vicarious liability and to apply them in
a manner that is both consistent and fair. There can be no doubt
that it will often be helpful for our courts to consider the
approach of other jurisdictions to problems that may be similar
to our own.4°
Noting, in the quotation cited at the beginning of this Article, that it would
seem "unduly parochial" not to look for guidance in how others have handled
similar issues, Justice O'Regan acknowledged that the "dangers of shallow
comparativism must be avoided."' Nonetheless, she continued, "[t]o forbid
any comparative review because of those risks... would be to deprive our
legal system of the benefits of the learning and wisdom to be found in other
jurisdictions."42
Each of the justices to whom I spoke echoed this theme: Why not look to
wherever wisdom may be found regarding a difficult issue of constitutional
law? Arthur Chaskalson, the widely respected first chiefjustice of the court,
who had founded the Legal Resources Centre which challenged apartheid laws
and represented, among many others, Nelson Mandela,43 thought it foolhardy,
if not arrogant, to cut oneself off from intellectual activity in the same field.'
Noting that in other professional disciplines-medicine, science, and
literature-people read widely, he failed to see why law should be different.45
Similarly, Justice Goldstone could see no downsides to the practice: "Nothing
" K v Minister of Safety & Security 2005 (6) SA 419 (CC) at 437-41 (S. Afr.).
40 Id. at 437.
41 Id.
42 Id.
4" Justice Arthur Chaskalson, Profile, http://www.concourt.gov.za/text/judges/current/justi
cearthurchaskalson/1.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2009).
44 See Interview with Justice Chaskalson, supra note 38.
45 Id.
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but gain. It's almost irrational to say you shouldn't look .... [W]hy cut
yourself off from learning... ?""
In addition to any positive ideas one may glean from looking at other
jurisdictions, a critical value pointed out by several of the justices is the
challenge provided by different approaches to one's own preconceptions. As
Justice Laurie Ackermann, one of the few judges to resign from the bench as
a matter of conscience during the apartheid era and an author who has written
thoughtfully in support of comparative jurisprudence,47 emphasized: "I think
the most important quality for a judge in any court, and certainly the highest
court, is to be ruthless about his or her own presuppositions. I mean we all
have them. The person who says he or she does not have them ... is in
danger."'48 Both he and Justice O'Regan see the intellectual approach to
foreign law quite differently from that of dealing with domestic precedent.
Looking at foreign authorities opens windows otherwise unseen, helps to
explore preconceptions, and aids in finding the limits to one's understandings.
Viewing another legal system's approach to similar problems helps shed light
on what the possibilities are, as well as illuminating the reasons for particular
developments in the law.49
While each of the justices had a somewhat different understanding about
the use of foreign law, all agreed that the practice has added value to the
court's jurisprudence. As they saw it, courts in open and democratic societies
face many common problems, and it makes good sense to look everywhere for
ideas on how best to solve those problems. In addition, seeing how another
jurisdiction approaches an issue can serve as a mirror to confront one's own
way of dealing with that issue, clarifying one's assumptions, and perhaps
leading one to question ingrained practices that no longer serve the interests
of society.
46 Interview with Justice Goldstone, supra note 33.
4"See, e.g., Laurie W.H. Ackermann, Constitutional Comparativism in South Africa: A
Response to Sir Basil Markesinis and Jdrg Fedtke, 80 TUL. L. REV. 169 (2005).
"s Interview with Laurie Ackermann, Former Justice, Constitutional Court of S. Afr., in Cape
Town, S. Afr. (Feb. 28, 2007).
'9 Id.; Interview with Justice O'Regan, supra note 38.
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Ill. ADDRESSING THE SKEPTICS
A. Sovereignty at Risk?
Part of the outcry against citation to foreign law appears to be based on an
unstated, but commonly believed, assumption: that American courts are
considering such sources binding in some way, and by following the
pronouncements of another country's court, they are ceding their rightful
sovereignty or, at a minimum, abdicating their responsibilities of adhering to
our own Constitution.5" This assumption is simply unfounded. None of the
numerous references to foreign law decried by critics of the practice has relied
on that law as providing authority for the conclusion reached, and courts
throughout the world that do look to foreign law universally see that law as
providing, at most, persuasive reasons for coming to particular decisions.5
If having regard for foreign law did indeed threaten the sovereignty of our
nation or the Supreme Court, the practice could justly be criticized and
shunned. Such a threat would only be plausible, however, if courts felt an
obligation to follow the rulings of judges in other jurisdictions. Because
judges engaged in comparative jurisprudence around the world, including
justices of the United States Supreme Court, feel no such obligation, the threat
is an empty one.
Critics of comparative jurisprudence often, whether deliberately or not,
raise the specter of United States courts "bowing" to foreign authorities.
" See, e.g., Kochan, supra note 9, at 541-42 (stating "the idea of sovereignty is under attack
in today's society - in part by judges who rely on extraterritorial authority").
s One commentator argues that the Court's references to foreign law in Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), actually amount to using such law as binding authority. See
Ernest A. Young, Foreign Law and the Denominator Problem, 119 HARv. L. REV. 148, 156
(2005); see also Ursula Bentele, Back to an International Perspective on the Death Penalty as
a Cruel Punishment: The Example of South Africa, 73 TUL. L. REV. 251 (1998) (arguing that an
international perspective is uniquely appropriate for assessing whether the death penalty violates
"the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society"). The Court
has stated that the meaning of "cruel and unusual" must "draw its meaning from the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." Trop v. Dulles, 356
U.S. 86, 101 (1958). How other maturing societies in the world define standards of decency is,
in this context, inherently part of the substantive analysis in ways that is not the case with other
areas of constitutional law. This type of reference to foreign law bears little relationship to the
kind of engagement with the opinions of other constitutional courts I address in this Article. My
focus is on "reason-centric" rather than "norm-centric" analysis. See Youngjae Lee,
International Consensus as Persuasive Authority in the Eighth Amendment, 156 U. PA. L.
REV. 63, 63 (2007).
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Asked during his confirmation hearings about the proper role, if any, of foreign
law in Supreme Court decisions, now Chief Justice Roberts, for example,
expressed concern about relying on decisions of other courts.5 2 Yet the
concept of "relying" on a foreign decision is far from what those who advocate
looking abroad have in mind. Academic opponents of considering foreign law
similarly tend to exaggerate the influence of such outside authorities,
suggesting a binding quality that simply is not, and should not be, there. One
such critic uses a quotation from Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, evidently
believing that it provides support for his position: "[T]here is no mystic over-
law to which even the United States must bow."53 Yet, given the context in
which this statement was made,54 Holmes saw no problem with the use of
foreign or international law-which was in fact central to this decision
involving maritime jurisdiction-noting that it becomes U.S. law only by
virtue of its adoption by an American court. The misconception that
comparative jurisprudence poses a threat to sovereignty appears to pervade
much of the opposition to the use of foreign law. In response to a call for his
impeachment-based on his joining an opinion by Justice Kennedy that
referred to foreign law 55-Justice Stevens rebutted this notion:
It does seem to me... that there is a vast difference between, on
the one hand, considering the thoughtful views of other scholars
and judges - whether they be Americans or foreigners and
whether they be state judges, federal judges or judges sitting in
other countries - before making up our own minds, and, on the
other hand, treating international opinion as controlling our
52 If we're relying on a decision from a German judge about what our
Constitution means, no President accountable to the people appointed that
judge, and no Senate accountable to the people confirmed that judge, and yet
he's playing a role in shaping a law that binds the people in this country. I
think that's a concern that has to be addressed.
Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, supra note 8, at 201.
3 Kochan, supra note 9, at 514 (quoting In re Western Maid, 257 U.S. 419, 432 (1922)).
5' The full quotation is provided in a footnote but was seemingly not read or understood.
Seeid. at 514 n.14.
" See Roper, 543 U.S. at 604 (reasoning that while evidence of international consensus
against a juvenile death penalty does not lead to the conclusion that the Eighth Amendment
forbids capital punishment of a minor, it nevertheless is relevant to the Court's "assessment of
evolving standards of decency").
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interpretation of our own law. We should not be impeached for
the former; we are not guilty of the latter.56
Mark Tushnet speculates that critics fear the slippery slope: if looking to
foreign law in legitimate ways-as an entirely non-binding source of
persuasive reasoning-is allowed, the practice in time will morph into treating
foreign law as precedent.57 This assessment may well be right, but what is
surely correct is his explanation of why that fear is logically unfounded given
the characteristics of working with precedent.58 As long as American judges
set forth their reasoning-whether or not containing references to foreign
law-in rendering their opinions, futurejudges will have been made explicitly
aware of the non-binding nature of the basis for the court's decision. 9
Among the other conclusions to be drawn from a study of the Constitutional
Court of South Africa, it appears, at least in this particular court, that any
anticipated slide down the slippery slope6" into improper or problematic use of
foreign law has not occurred. Neither in the court's judgments, nor in any of
the interviews with its justices, is there any evidence that it is bowing to
foreign authority.6 Quite often, after surveying extensively the position of
other jurisdictions, the court simply goes its own way, finding that South
Africa and its constitution require a different result.62 Or, the court may find
that a solution offered by a dissenting judge in another country fits well into
the South African context. One judge seemed positively put off by argument
suggesting that foreign authority should serve as precedent:
56 John Paul Stevens, Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, Justice Stevens' Remarks at the
Seventh Circuit Judicial Conference Dinner, at 3, 8 (May 23, 2005), quoted in Diane Marie
Amann, International Law and Rehnquist-Era Reversals, 94 GEO. L.J. 1319, 1329 (2006).
" Mark Tushnet, Referring to Foreign Law in Constitutional Interpretation: An Episode in
the Culture Wars, 35 U. BALT. L. REv. 299, 306-07 (2006).
18 Id. at 307-09.
19 Id. at 307-08.
60 See Eugene Volokh, The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 HARV. L.
REv. 1026, 1030-32 (2003), cited in Tushnet, supra note 57, at 307.
61 All the justices stressed that foreign law does not serve as precedent. Justice Sachs stated,
"We don't look to foreign law, including jurisprudence, for binding precedent. How would you
say one United States Supreme Court decision is worth two Canadian, three German, four
Namibian, five Indian-it's got nothing to do with that." Interview with Justice Sachs, supra
note 31.
62 See, e.g., infra notes 136, 148-50 and accompanying text.
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It seems to me... that very often what happens with counsel is
that they do argue a case as if it is ... persuasive, and we should
therefore follow it simply because some other court somewhere
in the world has adopted it. And I must be honest, I am really
unpersuaded by that.63
Nowhere is there any hint that the country's, or the court's, sovereignty might
be undermined because the court looked to see how others were handling a
problem. Justice Albie Sachs put it this way:
On the sovereignty aspect, funnily enough I would see it the other
way around. What are you so scared of in foreign jurisprudence?
Are you so lacking in confidence about the strength of your own
system that you can't absorb and take in and get the best out of
what other people have to offer?'
B. Concerns About Methodology
I think that it presents a host of practical problems that have been
pointed out. You have to decide which countries you are going
to survey, and then it is often difficult to understand exactly what
you are to make of foreign court decisions. All countries don't
set up their court systems the same way. Foreign courts may
have greater authority than the courts of the United States ....
So you'd have to understand the jurisdiction and the authority of
the foreign courts.
And then sometimes it's misleading to look to just one narrow
provision of foreign law without considering the larger body of
law in which it's located .... [I]f you focus too narrowly on
that, you may distort the big picture, so for those reasons, I just
don't think that's a useful thing to do.65
Judge (now Justice), Samuel Alito
Now, should we say, "Oh my, we're out of step," so, you know
- or, take our abortion jurisprudence, we are one of only six
63 Interview with Justice O'Regan, supra note 38.
6 Interview with Justice Sachs, supra note 3 1.
65 See Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, supra note 2.
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countries in the world that allows abortion on demand at any time
prior to viability. Should we change that because other countries
feel differently? Or, maybe a more pertinent question: Why
haven't we changed that, if indeed the court thinks we should use
foreign law? Or do we just use foreign law selectively? When
it agrees with what, you know, what the justice would like the
case to say, you use the foreign law, and when it doesn't agree
you don't use it.66
Justice Antonin Scalia
This Part explores the potential difficulties encountered in looking to
foreign law. First, to which countries should one turn for insight into
particular problems? Second, how can one address the charge of "cherry
picking"? And finally, what steps can be taken to minimize the possibility of
misinterpreting foreign law or making unwarranted comparisons?
1. Where to Look
The South African justices are keenly aware of the pitfalls inherent in
constitutional comparativism. Specifically on the issue of what foreign
jurisdictions are appropriate sources of wisdom, Deputy Chief Justice
Moseneke, in the continuation of the statements quoted at the beginning of this
Article, explained the key elements that must be present: an open, democratic
society, preferably with a comparable adversarial system of adjudication in
which the issues of a case are formulated and debated, and culminate in a
reasoned judgment explaining the outcome.67 Justice Sachs emphasized the
same elements, noting that "far and away the Canadian Supreme Court has
become our favorite source of plunder [laughter]," partly because the South
African Bill of Rights was modeled on the Canadian charter, with its structure
of establishing rights that are subject to reasonable limitations and the central
role played by the notion of proportionality.68 Justice Sachs also found the
Canadian court to be "a particularly progressive, contemporary and value-
driven court that articulates standards and norms for contemporary society in
a very special way."69
See Debate on Foreign Law, supra note 4.
67 Interview with Deputy Chief Justice Moseneke, supra note 5.
68 Interview with Justice Sachs, supra note 3 1.
69 Id.
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Noting that where to look depends in part on the nature of the question,
Justice Sachs recalled that on economic issues, the court found valuable the
vision of the Indian Supreme Court in a society, like that of South Africa, of
massive inequalities.7" Justice van der Westhuizen agreed that "for socio-
economic rights, we would perhaps look to the Indian Supreme Court."'" As
the only member of the current court to speak German, Justice van der
Westhuizen included that country as one to which the court might well refer
with regard to property rights. In terms of areas such as privacy, this justice
saw the United States jurisprudence an obvious source, given the high value
placed on privacy in our society.
All the justices operated on the assumption that the jurisprudence of other
countries would only be helpful to the extent that it reflected the values of
open and democratic societies dedicated to freedom and equality.72 The
concern about which countries to consult is also, of course, greatly diminished
given the dialogical or analytical approach that is most prevalent in the
judgments.73 Only to the extent that foreign opinions are used as precedent, or
even as persuasive authority, would their origin in a country adhering to
different principles be problematic.
2. Cherry Picking
In a case touching on the reach of freedom of the press when it collides
with the judiciary's desire to control the courtroom, Deputy Chief Justice
Moseneke confronted the issue of cherry picking, a common criticism by
opponents of the practice of looking abroad. The issue in SABC v. National
Director of Public Prosecutions was whether the Supreme Court of Appeal
had the discretion to reject a broadcaster's application to televise an appellate
argument involving the conviction of Schabir Shaik, the financial advisor to
Deputy-President Jacob Zuma, on corruption and fraud charges.74 As Justice
Moseneke saw it, the court's discretion was limited by the need to adhere to
the tenets of freedom of expression and open justice enshrined in the Bill of
Rights.75 Looking to foreign law, thejustice found that Canada permitted live
70 Id.
71 Interview with Justice van der Westhuizen, supra note 35.
72 Interviews with the justices of the Constitutional Court of S. Afr., supra note 5.
" See infra notes 123-26 and accompanying text.
74 S. Afr. Broad. Corp. v Natl Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions 2007 (1) SA 523 (CC), at 523 (S.
Mr.).
71 Interview with Deputy Chief Justice Moseneke, supra note 5.
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feed of its appellate arguments.76 When he included this reference in the draft
of his dissenting opinion, the majority judgment, which had not included any
foreign law in its initial draft, pointed to jurisdictions that refused to allow
such live broadcasts. Justice Moseneke admitted candidly:
Yes, we cherry pick all the time when we use authorities, foreign
or domestic .... The very process of adjudication implies a
selection, and a reasoned and rational process to search for the
truth by weeding out what's irrelevant and finding what is
cohesive and that best answers ... the problem before us. 77
As these comments suggest, the term "cherry picking," although generally
used as a pejorative, can also simply refer to the process of selecting
authorities that may help resolve the issue at hand. Chief Justice Chaskalson
conceptualized the issue in this way as well, noting that each judgment reflects
the author's best effort to arrive at the most reasonable outcome, using
whatever opinions provide support for the solution chosen.78 Simply because
a particular court's holdings in one case are persuasive does not require
adherence to that court's decisions in the next. It is the reasoning that
influences one's judgment, and being open to persuasion is a critical part of
that process. Similarly, Justice Sachs considered the search for "cherries" to
be part of the learning process that broadens the mind of a judge looking at
problems with which others have grappled.79 He saw little danger in the notion
of cherry picking, noting that "it's got to be a cherry that fits. If it doesn't fit,
it'll just roll off, and it will actually be destructive of the argument."' On the
other hand, exploring foreign authorities has great value, as when a case from
another jurisdiction goes contrary to a judge's inclinations, "you do sit up."8
Beyond overcoming parochialism, such research puts judges in touch with
soundly based contemporary thinking on common issues.
Of course the critics maintain that, rather than canvassing the whole field
and honestly describing the state of the law in foreign jurisdictions, justices
actually make their selections based purely on their initial subjective
conclusions on the matter, using foreign authority to bolster a decision when
76 Id.
77 Id.
7 Interview with Justice Chaskalson, supra note 38.
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in fact other authority would have led them to the opposite result.8 2 Justice
Goldstone saw such objections as demeaning to the judicial profession,
suggesting that no judge with any intellectual honesty would engage in such
a practice. 3
Justice Johann Kriegler-a provincial and appellate judge under the old
regime, also active in supporting human rights and public interest
organizations fighting against apartheid-was the most sympathetic to the
problem of selective citation to foreign authorities." Because foreign
materials are less readily available to counsel, he saw a greater risk of the
misleading use of such sources. 5 As the sources are not familiar to many
readers, it is not always clear whether the law is being stated accurately.
Mistakes may be made inadvertently by citing to secondary texts whose
reliability may be questionable. Such concerns appear to be based, in part, on
the fear that even well-motivated judges may misunderstand foreign
authorities. The next section addresses that challenge.
3. Danger of Misinterpretation
The South African justices acknowledged the difficulties involved in
understanding foreign law correctly, as well as the obstacles that must be
overcome, particularly when dealing with a system using a different language.
Former Chief Justice Chaskalson readily agreed that there are difficulties with
understanding other systems, language problems, and risks of
misinterpretation. Yet, he concluded, "[T]hat doesn't mean that you mustn't
look. I think you must just be careful, and you've got to understand that
everything comes in a particular context. What was happening in Canada is
not necessarily appropriate to what is happening in South Africa or might
happen in Sri Lanka."86 He also saw particular problems when using foreign
languages, but noted that there is a rich source ofjurisprudence in the English-
speaking world, including all the Commonwealth countries, America, as well
as European courts that translate their judgments into English.87
82 See, e.g., supra note 66 and accompanying text.
83 Interview with Justice Goldstone, supra note 33.
Interview with Justice Kriegler, supra note 33.
85 Id.




In one case, thejustices, uncharacteristically, disagreed quite strongly about
the appropriateness of referring to foreign law. 8 Plaintiffs claiming police
abuse brought an action seeking constitutional damages, beyond compensatory
and punitive damages, for infringement of their rights to dignity, freedom, and
security of the person; privacy; and criminal process.80 The court, noting that
the plaintiffs placed considerable reliance on foreign law, looked to how other
jurisdictions approached the issue.9" At the beginning of his survey of foreign
law, Justice Ackermann issued this warning:
More than the usual caution is necessary in the present enquiry
since the law of delict/torts differs in various legal systems,
certain judicial systems and their legal remedies are divided
along federal and state lines, sovereign immunity is not treated
identically and the nature and histories of the various
constitutional dispensations are not the same.9"
After this disclaimer, Justice Ackermann went on to provide lengthy
descriptions of the laws in the United States,92 Canada, 93 and the United
Kingdom,94 among others, and closed with a summary of the state of the law
in all these jurisdictions.95 This summary is followed, in turn, with yet another
word of caution-that significant differences between the law and procedure
of these countries and those in South Africa must be kept in mind.96 The court
ultimately concluded that, because private and public law provided adequate
remedies, there was no need for "constitutional damages" in the case at hand. 97
While agreeing with the outcome, Justices Kriegler and O'Regan made
known their objections to the main judgment's extensive references to foreign
88 Fose v Minister of Safety & Security 1997 (3) SA 786 (CC) (S. Afr.).
" Id. at 795-96.
90 Id. at 801.
91 Id. at 786 (citations omitted). The South African court notes that its "usual concern" when
using foreign law in domestic decisions is demonstrated in cases such as Ferreira v Levin &
Others; Vryenhoek & Others v Powell & Others 1996 (1) SA 984 (CC) at 1025 and Bernstein
v Bester 1996 (2) SA 751 (CC) at 811-12 (Kreiger, J., concurring). Id.
92 Id. at 801-07.
9' Id. at 807-09.
94 Id. at 809-11.
9' Id. at 817-18.
9' Id. at 819.
97 The court subsequently upheld an award for constitutional damages in a case where no
other remedy was suitable. President of the RSA v Modderklip 2005 (5) SA 3 (CC) (S. Afr.).
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law. In his concurring opinion, Justice Kriegler expressed the view that Justice
Ackermann had ranged too broadly, noting specifically: "I decline to engage
in a debate about the merits or otherwise of remedies devised by jurisdictions
whose common law relating to remedies for civil wrongs bears no resemblance
to ours and whose constitutional provisions have but passing similarity to our
[relevant section]."9' Justice O'Regan's concurring opinion states, in its
entirety:
I concur fully in the order proposed by Ackermann J[.] and I
concur in his judgment with one reservation. For the reasons
given [on pages 819 to 821] of his judgment, it is my view that
the appellant's reliance on foreign jurisprudence is of little value
in interpreting the provisions of our Constitution. Accordingly
I wish to express no view upon the law applicable in the
jurisdictions discussed by Ackermann J[.] [on pages 801 to 819]
of his judgment. 99
Justice Ackermann, while confirming that particular areas of constitutional
law, such as the separation of powers doctrine, are more problematic than
others, nonetheless thought comparativejurisprudence could be useful even in
those areas, as long as one kept in mind the potential difficulties of
transplanting structures with different purposes in various systems.'0° On
another occasion, Justice O'Regan made the same point, noting that it is
important when engaging in comparative jurisprudence "not to equate legal
institutions which are not, in truth, comparable."'' Yet there, unlike in Fose,
she found the approach of other legal systems relevant.
As with the notion of cherry picking, Justice Kriegler expressed the most
concern with the difficulties of interpretation inherent in the process of
referring to the law in other jurisdictions. He was particularly reluctant to sign
on to allusions to German law, although he was somewhat familiar with the
language, noting:
It's not an easy language, and it's certainly not technically an
easy language. And there are writing styles, techniques, [and]
98 Fose (1) SA 984 (CC) at 833.
99 Id. at 839.
t0' Interview with Justice Ackermann, supra note 48.
'0' K v Minister of Safety & Security 2005 6 SA 419 (CC) at 437.
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mannerisms in legal writing in German, quite apart from always
putting the verb in the wrong place. And people blindly
concurred with Laurie [Ackermann]'s judgments. I couldn't do
that; if I can't get to the guts of what it's about, if I don't
understand what they are really saying, what is built on that, I
can't go along with it. 10
2
Justice Kriegler questioned the reliability of references in another language,
noting that one could easily assume that familiar phrases had the same meaning
in different cultures, unaware of their nuances and refinements. "[I]fyou don't
know what those are, I think you are blundering into a workshop where there
are machines working the purpose of which and the complications of which
you don't understand. So get out of it; stay out of it."' 3 With a wonderful
mixture of metaphors, Justice Kriegler warned, not only of the potential
dangers of blundering into this workshop, but, "If you transplant jacarandas,
they'll take over and replace the indigenous plants."'" For example, while it
might be appropriate to give prosecutors discretion to use the law of civil
forfeiture in the United States, such discretion might well lead to injustice in
Africa, where the right to property is not a root value.
Deputy Chief Justice Moseneke acknowledged concerns about the
difficulties in interpreting foreign law, about "getting it right," but emphasized
the court's efforts to reduce the impact of the problem." 5
We rarely go beyond what we know-common law
jurisdictions... [with] points of comparison with our own ....
Many, many years of association and historical links make[ ] it
quite easy for one to be quite certain that one understands an
English judgment. Americanjudgments we understand-we read
[them] all the time.'0 6
He also stressed that the court was aware that there might be unarticulated
premises in other legal systems that a foreign eye might not understand,
102 Interview with Justice Kriegler, supra note 33.
103 Id.
1 4 I d .
o' Interview with Deputy Chief Justice Moseneke, supra note 5.
106 Id.
2009]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
making it important to focus on general principles, rather than getting into
specific details." 7
Justices Goldstone and van der Westhuizen described both informal
contacts and institutional support that assist the justices in their practice of
looking to foreign law. Justice Goldstone noted that increasingly there are
meetings among judges from all over the world, "what Anne Marie Slaughter
calls the invisible college."' ' It was at one such meeting that he inquired of
a German constitutional court judge about the German pardon power in
connection with his opinion in the Hugo case." 9 Agreeing that some areas of
the law pose greater complexity, Justice Goldstone did not see great difficulty
here: "You know, if one is looking at a review power, a president's pardon
power, what do you need to know? One looks at their constitutions and you
read a little bit around . ,,.0 Justice van der Westhuizen noted that with
complex constitutional questions he might well not begin, for example, with
a long United States Supreme Court case with five different opinions, but
rather look to a respected textbook for a basic understanding of the key
principles. "' Justice van der Westhuizen also mentioned the good relationship
between the South African court and members of the German constitutional
court."
12
In addition, Justice van der Westhuizen noted the valuable assistance both
from foreign law interns and from counsel. Aside from their two South
African law clerks, the justices have the benefit of up to five clerks selected
from applicants around the world.' Asked about a recentjudgment that made
extensive references to the American law of administrative searches,' " he
remarked that he was fortunate to have a "very excellent, recently graduated
Harvard Law School intern" to work on the opinion. "It helped that I had
somebody close[ ] at hand who felt quite comfortable with the details." 115
107 Id.
0 Interview with Justice Goldstone, supra note 33.
109 Id. For a discussion of Hugo, see infra notes 206-13 and accompanying text.
10 Interview with Justice Goldstone, supra note 33.
. Interview with Justice van der Westhuizen, supra note 35.
112 Id.
1' These clerks are attached to the various chambers in turn. Justice Goldstone mentioned
that one year he had an intern from Korea who also spent some time with Justice Kriegler. The
interns are not paid by the court, but most are able to receive funding from private sources.
14 Magajane v Chairperson, N. W. Gambling Bd. 2006 (5) SA 250 (CC) at 265 &
n.41, 274, 269 n.58.
" Interview with Justice van der Westhuizen, supra note 35.
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The danger of "getting it wrong" can be reduced substantially when counsel
on opposite sides of the case provide their best arguments about why a foreign
authority should sway the court in a particular direction." 6 In this sense,
engaging with foreign law is no different than citing to domestic authorities
that may be subject to conflicting interpretations.
IV. THE PROCESS OF WORKING WITH FOREIGN LAW
Once persuaded of the benefits to be gained from looking abroad, and
aware of the potential pitfalls, the challenge is to make the best possible use
of such outside authorities. This section describes in detail a number of cases
addressing various constitutional issues in which the Constitutional Court of
South Africa made significant references to foreign law. The discussion
explores how engaging with such outside sources may have influenced the
court's decision making, and how the court avoided the kind of superficial or
problematic use of such authorities envisaged by critics of this practice.
Comments of the justices during their interviews, some of which focused
explicitly on specific judgments, supplement the analysis.
When South African justices refer to foreign law, they generally do so in
considerable detail, truly grappling with the way the problem at hand was dealt
with by others and explaining why that approach should, or should not, be
adopted under their own constitution. By contrast, recent references to foreign
law by some members of the United States Supreme Court that prompted the
current controversy have been quite brief and unilluminating." 7  The
methodology of the Constitutional Court of South Africa, which exposes the
reader to the thought processes leading to the ultimate conclusion, is critical
to the credibility and legitimacy of the practice. Such transparency not only
furthers confidence in the court's decisions by setting forth the reasoning in
support of particular outcomes, especially when those outcomes are
contentious, but also allows any dissenting justices to confront and challenge
the rationale being espoused through the foreign materials.
Several of the justices explained how they view the process of engaging
with foreign law, stressing the care it takes to use it appropriately. Justice
..6 See Rahdert, supra note 11, at 601-02, 654 (examining that the difficulty for counsel to
competently sift through and gather international legal materials impedes the use of international
legal precedent because courts often rely on counsel to provide the court with precedents
necessary to render a proper decision).
"7 See Sanford Levinson, Looking Abroad When Interpreting the US. Constitution: Some
Reflections, 39 TEx. INT'L L.J. 353, 362-63 (2004).
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O'Regan, using as an example the issue of how to deal with evidence that may
have been illegally obtained, first made clear that one must begin with the
constitutional framework." i South Africa did not adopt a blanket exclusionary
rule, opting instead to prohibit the use of evidence secured in violation of
rights only when its use would harm the administration ofjustice. Questions
therefore focus, not simply on whether evidence was in fact illegally obtained,
but on what constitutes harm to the administration ofjustice." 9 Decisions in
jurisdictions like the United States, with automatic exclusionary rules, do not
have the same relevance as those in Canada, which employs the same two-step
approach. 2 ' Yet, looking at how American judges address similar problems
can still be valuable, as long as it is kept in mind that factors that, in the United
States, would be analyzed in terms of the definition of the right, might more
appropriately be considered in terms of justification in the South African
context.
This kind of awareness of differences in constitutional text and structure is
critical to the proper use of foreign materials. Yet, even given such
differences, valuable insights can be gained by examining the ways courts
approach common problems. As Justice Albie Sachs described it, "we're
looking for philosophy, the aptness of an articulation, and . . . how
contemporary courts are dealing with similar issues."12 ' In his experience, he
found that although the constitutional context might be very different, "one
gets a lot of help from the manner in which courts approach the issues, how
they classify the issues, and the factors that lead them to come down in the way
that they do."' 2 2
Judgments in cases involving different areas of constitutional law illustrate
the multiple, varied, and sophisticated ways in which the South African court
engages with foreign legal resources. Professor Choudhry's seminal article on
the early years of this court's practice of looking to foreign law provides a
18 Interview with Justice O'Regan, supra note 38.
,,9 S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 35(5) ("Evidence obtained in a manner that violates any right in
the Bill of Rights must be excluded if the admission of that evidence would render the trial unfair
or otherwise be detrimental to the administration of justice.").
.20 The exclusionary rule in Canada, like that in South Africa, does not automatically result
in exclusion once a constitutional violation is established. Instead, if evidence has been obtained
in an unconstitutional manner, a discretionary analysis is triggered to determine its admissibility.
See Part I of the Constitutional Act, 1982, § 24(2), Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 1I
(U.K.).




useful categorization of the methodology used by the justices: universalist,
dialogical, and genealogical. 23  Under universalist interpretation,
constitutional courts are seeking to identify and apply the same set of legal
principles that underlie basic constitutional guarantees. 124  When using
dialogical interpretation, courts engage with foreign law to cast a mirror on
their own jurisprudence, finding either similarities or differences that help to
identify the normative and factual assumptions at work.'25 Finally, the
genealogical approach considers areas of constitutional doctrine that are tied
together through historical relationships. 26
The following Part describes some of the court's judgments, 27 adding the
justices' own characterizations of their methodology. Whether addressing
criminal procedure issues, the balancing of individual rights against the
interests of the state, the liability of the government for the conduct and
omissions of its agents, or the reach of the powers of the different branches of
the government, the court's treatment of foreign law is careful, nuanced, and
fully aware of the importance of seeing each jurisdiction's law in its proper
context. It appears from this examination that the approach Choudhry calls
dialogical, which might alternatively be described as analytical,'28 plays the
most significant role, even when the court is seeking to determine whether
universalist principles have developed or when it is analyzing provisions tied
genealogically to other constitutional instruments. Because such dialogical or
analytical use of foreign law can reap the greatest benefits, and because it is
also the most legitimate as a jurisprudential matter,'29 it is particularly
appropriate to observe this methodology in action in cases involving various
subject matter areas.
123 Sujit Choudhry, Globalization in Search of Justification: Toward a Theory of
Comparative Constitutional Interpretation, 74 IND. L.J. 819 (1999).
124 Id. at 833.
125 Id. at 835-36.
126 Id. at 838.
127 Choudhry's disclaimer is applicable to this study as well, in that the selection of cases is
in no way comprehensive or representative. Id. at 841 n.90. The aim is simply to present
examples of comparative constitutional adjudication that may persuade some American judges
that the enterprise is worth considering.
28 Cf. du Bois& Visser, supra note 29, at 658 (describing South African court's consultation
of foreign law as "analytical").
129 See Choudhry, supra note 123, at 892 (explaining that dialogical interpretation is most
legitimate "because it makes no normative claims regarding comparative jurisprudence").
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A. Early Cases Adjusting Criminal Procedure to the New Constitutional Order
In its first published opinion, the court signaled clearly how seriously and
carefully it would take the constitutional invitation to "consider foreign law."
In this case, State v Zuma, the court considered a challenge to the
constitutionality of the statutory presumption that a written confession to a
magistrate was freely and voluntarily made, thereby placing the burden on an
accused to prove that it had been made under duress.13 The court described
in some detail the way other jurisdictions had analyzed the issue of when the
prosecution could rely on a legal presumption, thereby placing the burden of
rebuttal on the defendant, without violating the principle that an accused is
presumed innocent. 31 Acting Justice Kentridge, speaking for a unanimous
court, found "illuminating" '132 the various solutions offered by courts in the
United States, Canada, the Privy Council, and the European Court of Human
Rights, concluding that reversing the burden of proof in this way seriously
compromised the principle that the prosecution must prove guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. 133
Given acceptance of the prosecution's burden of proof throughout the
history of the common law, Justice Kentridge found that it was inherent in
South Africa's constitutional provisions regarding the right to a fair trial. 134 As
Choudhry has demonstrated, to this point the court looked to foreign law to
discover the universal norms applicable to criminal proceedings. 135 Yet, after
canvassing that foreign law, Justice Kentridge returned to the words of the
South African Constitution and ultimately concluded that, although the
Canadian Charter had similar limitations provisions, the differences in
language required a somewhat different solution. Accordingly, Justice
Kentridge rejected counsel's submission that the court should adopt the criteria
developed by the Canadian courts, such as the existence of substantial and
pressing public needs met by the impugned statute:
These criteria may well be of assistance to our Courts in cases
where a delicate balancing of individual rights against social
interests is required. But [section] 33(1) itself sets out the criteria
130 S v Zuma 1995 (2) SA 642 (CC) at 646-47 (S. Afr.).
131 Id. at 653-59.
132 Id. at 653.
133 Id. at 659.
134 Id.
131 See Choudhry, supra note 123, at 846-48.
[Vol. 37:219
MINING FOR GOLD
which we are to apply, and I see no reason, in this case at least,
to attempt to fit our analysis into the Canadian pattern. '36
In another early case addressing defendants' rights in the criminal
context,' the court dealt with the constitutional validity of a statutory
provision that "compels a person summoned to an enquiry to testify and
produce documents, even though such person seeks to invoke the privilege
against self-incrimination. ' '138  In each of the six sections of Justice
Ackermann's opinion, he makes substantial references to foreign law.
Ackermann asserts that "[i]n construing and applying our Constitution, we are
dealing with fundamental legal norms which are steadily becoming more
universal in character.' ' 139  His apparent approach is to anticipate the
universalization of legal norms by considering foreign jurisprudence that
reflects those norms. Justice Ackermann regards the Supreme Court of
Canada's multiple opinions in Thomson Newspapers Ltd. v. Canada4 ° as
"instructive both on the issue of the ambit of the right to liberty in s[ection] 7
of the Charter (the right to freedom in s[ection] 1(1) of our Constitution) and
the possible limitation of such right in terms of s[ection] 1 of the Charter
(s[ection] 33(1) of our Constitution)."'' Ackermann also considers German
jurisprudence:
The German Court is more inclined to exercise a stricter form of
scrutiny on the basis of [German Basic Law] s[ection] 2(1) when
the infringement is somehow analogous to the infringement of
another right or freedom, not dissimilar to the heightened
scrutiny the [U.S.] Supreme Court employs through the
'fundamental rights' strand ofjurisprudence under that part of the
Fourteenth Amendment that deals with due process. 42
Returning to Canada, Ackermann explains that he "referred somewhat
extensively" to the dissenting opinions in Thomson Newspapers "because they
136 Zuma 1995(2) SA (CC) at 660.
' Ferreira v Levin & Others; Vryenhoek v. Powell NO & Others 1996 (1) SA 984 (CC) (S.
Afr.).
' Id. at 997.
"9 Id. at 1025.
'40 [1990] 1 S.C.R. 425 (Can.).
'41 Ferreira 1996 (1) SA 984 (CC) at 1026.
142 Id. at 1035 (citations to treatises on U.S. constitutional law omitted).
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represent the high-water mark in the judgment for striking down a provision
which compels self-incrimination and only affords a direct use immunity."'43
His explication of the dissenting justices' reasoning informs his own remedial
options because only their positions required that valid "use immunity"
provisions bar not only "direct" evidence but "derivative" evidence as well.'"
In the final part of his opinion, Justice Ackermann asserts that the court is "not
obliged to follow the absolutist United States approach," which is based on
"'the explicit and seemingly absolute right against self-incrimination found in
that country's Constitution.' ""' Ackermann additionally distinguishes the
United States insofar as it "has vastly greater resources, in all respects and at
all levels, than this country when it comes to the investigation and prosecution
of crime, [which] ... support[s] the adoption of a flexible approach in dealing
with the admissibility of derivative evidence."' 46
As can be seen, while Justice Ackermann's own justifications for
considering foreign law are typically couched in "universalist" rhetoric, much
of his actual analysis is properly regarded as dialogical. Despite his
disinclination to draw "direct analogies,"' 47 Ackermann gleans meaningful
insights by comparing foreign constitutions to the South African constitution,
distinguishing the factual backgrounds of certain foreign cases, and sometimes
even comparing two foreign jurisdictions to each other, without immediate
reference to South Africa. Ackermann's opinion in this case is a full and vivid
example of how consultation with comparable foreign jurisprudence may be
highly effective when done seriously and comprehensively.
B. Balancing the Individual's Right to Religious Expression with Societal
Goals; The Right to Human Dignity with a Free Press
A case presenting the oft-recurring issue of how to balance the individual's
right to practice religion with society's interests in maintaining general welfare
shows the South African court's careful attention to the way otherjurisdictions
approach the question. In Prince v. President, Cape Law Society, & Others,
a closely divided nine-member court (with two members not sitting) concluded
that the petitioner's desire to continue to use marijuana as part of the rituals of
143 Id. at 1049.
144 Id. at 1050-51.
145 Id. at 1076.
l4 Id. at 1077.
147 Id. at 1025-37.
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his Rastafarian religion precluded his acceptance into the legal profession. 4 '
The three opinions in the case, two in dissent and one for the majority, all
made reference to the way similar questions had been handled in other
countries, 149 yet ultimately based their decisions on what they perceived as the
appropriate solution for South Africa.150
On the threshold issue of the proper test to use in analyzing this issue, the
justices were unanimous in preferring the approach used in the United States
before 1990 and espoused by the minority in Employment Division v. Smith,' 5'
rather than the principle announced by Justice Scalia for the majority in that
case. The new standard adopted by the United States Supreme Court precludes
a successful claim based on the free exercise of religion when the right
asserted is prohibited by a " 'valid and neutral law of general
applicability.' "'52 The South African justices all found this approach
inconsistent with the South African Constitution's strong protection of
individual religious freedom, preferring instead the Smith minority's
conclusion that in order to trump a person's conduct based on an honestly held
religious belief, the governmental interest at stake must be compelling and the
means used narrowly tailored to achieve it.'53
Applying the balance of interests to the issue at hand, the majority of the
South African court-in a joint opinion by Justices Chaskalson, Ackermann,
and Kriegler-found that the strong law enforcement needs with regard to the
control of marijuana outweighed the individual's right to use the substance as
part of the exercise of his religious beliefs. 54 Here, too, reference to foreign
sources played a significant role. The majority noted that the justices in Smith,
who would have granted an exemption for the use of peyote during Native
American church services, stressed that because the drug tastes bitter, it was
unlikely to be used recreationally by its members outside the church.' By
contrast, were marijuana to be legalized for sacramental purposes, it would be
148 2002 (2) SA 794 (CC) at 845 (S. Aft.).
149 Id. at 837-40; id. at 815 (Ngcobo, J., dissenting); id. at 852-53 (Sachs, J., dissenting).
150 Id. at 841-45; id. at 826-27 (Ngcobo, J., dissenting); id at 852 (Sachs, J., dissenting).
151 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
152 Id. at 879 (citing United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J.,
concurring)).
153 Id. at 894 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Prince 2002 (2) SA 794 (CC) at 839; id. at 826-27
(Ngcobo, J., dissenting); id. at 852 (Sachs, J., dissenting).
114 Prince 2002 (2) SA 794 (CC) at 844-45.
'5 Id. at 839.
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extremely difficult to control its other uses, particularly as Rastafarians, unlike
the Native American Church, are very poorly organized.'56
Justice Sachs, while joining in Justice Ngcobo's dissent, wrote separately
to stress lessons he drew from Americanjurisprudence that differed from those
of the majority. Conceding that the dissent in the Smith case had distinguished
peyote from marijuana, he nonetheless concluded that Justice Blackmun's
opinion as a whole would support a narrowly tailored exemption to allow a
well-controlled supply of marijuana for sacramental use in South Africa.'57 He
then stressed the critical role of the courts in protecting the rights of vulnerable
minorities, here citing to an opinion by Chief Justice Burger in which he
warned of "requirements of contemporary society exerting a hydraulic
insistence on conformity to majoritarian standards."'5 Such "hydraulic
insistence," he continued,
could have a particularly negative impact on the Rastafari, who
are easily identifiable, subject to prejudice and politically
powerless, indeed, precisely the kind of discrete and insular
56 Id. at 841-43. The court also distinguished the instant case from R. v. Parker, [2000] 49
O.R.3d 481 (Can.), a Canadian case cited by the appellant, which had held a section of the drug
law unconstitutional because, though authorized, no exemption had been created permitting
medical use of marijuana. Given the genealogical relationship between the Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms and the Constitution of South Africa (particularly with respect to the
format which lists rights and limitations on those rights), the majority carefully examined the
reasons underlying the decision by the Ontario Appeal Court in Parker. The court found that,
unlike religious exemptions, medical exemptions permitting the use of cannabis when deemed
medically necessary are both consistent with international protocols and amenable to control.
Prince 2002 (2) SA 794 (CC) at 840. Further, the court noted that in a subsequent decision, the
judges who decided Parker rejected a challenge to the criminalization of the possession of
cannabis, holding that the prohibition was valid in all respects except for its failure to include
an exemption for medical use. Id. The court's treatment of Parker is particularly noteworthy
because of the depth of analysis it demonstrates; the court carefully distinguishes the cases and
even looks to subsequent Canadian jurisprudence for confirmation of its analysis. Id.
Appellant's citation to another Canadian decision, R. v. Clay [2000] 49 O.R.3d 577 (Can.), also
prompted the court to look at the procedural posture of the case, noting a possible appeal.
Similarly, the court was skeptical about a Guamanian case, People v. Guerrero, 2000 Guam 26,
where the court found the government had not sustained its burden in demonstrating that the
prohibition against marijuana served a compelling governmental interest. The South African
court again noted that an appeal was pending. Id. at 839-40. And indeed, the decision was
overturned on appeal. See Guam v. Guerrero, 290 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 2002).
117 Prince 2002 (2) SA 794 (CC) at 851 n.22 (Sachs, J., dissenting).
'S8 Id. at 853 (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 217 (1972)) (upholding the right of
Amish parents to keep their fourteen and fifteen-year-old children out of school).
[Vol. 37:219
MINING FOR GOLD
minority whose interests courts abroad and in this country have
come jealously to protect. 159
In light of these principles, Justice Sachs concluded that, although the
petitioners might not be entitled to all that they asked for, the state should be
obligated to provide some accommodation to avoid requiring them to choose
between their faith and respect for the law. 6°
The South African Constitution obliges all courts, when developing the
common law, to "promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of
Rights.""'' In performing this role, the Constitutional Court has not
infrequently looked abroad to see how other jurisdictions handle legal issues
presenting possible conflicts with constitutional norms. In one case involving
a challenge to the continued viability of a common law rule, the question was
whether the common law of defamation was inconsistent with the
constitutional protection of freedom of speech and of the press.'62 The
newspaper defendant, sued for defamation by a well-known political figure
whom it had accused of being under police investigation for involvement with
a gang of bank robbers, moved to dismiss the claim on the ground that the
plaintiff had not alleged that the defamatory statements were in fact false and
thus failed to allege a cause of action. 63 The common law in South Africa had
not required that plaintiffs allege and prove the falsity of any defamatory
statements, and the truth of the statement could serve as a defense in such an
action."6 The newspaper claimed that placing this burden on the press
infringed on freedom of expression guaranteed under the new constitution by
its potential chilling effect, relying heavily on the American principles
announced in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.
165
159 Id. at 853 (citing LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 582 (2d
ed. 1988) (discussing the famous Carolene Products footnote suggesting increased judicial
protection of "discrete and insular" minorities)).
'60 See id. at 847-48 (stating that allowing Rastafarians some form of exemption from the law
would be reasonable and would provide them with a modest measure of dignity and recognition).
161 S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 39(2).
162 Khumalo & Others v Holomisa 2002 (5) SA 401 (CC) at 408 (S. Afr.).
163 Id.
164 Id. at 409.
165 376 U.S. 254 (1964). The newspaper used the case solely to argue that plaintiffs must
establish that the defamatory article was false, not to urge adoption of the rule that plaintiffs may
succeed only upon proof of "actual malice" by the publisher. Khumalo 2002 (5) SA 401 (CC)
at 423.
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The court, speaking unanimously through Justice O'Regan, set forth a
lengthy quote from Justice Brennan's opinion in which he described the
dangers of chilling criticism of officials through the onerous burden of
establishing the truth of every statement printed, dangers that would result in
undesirable "self-censorship."' 66 Characterizing the Sullivan decision as "the
high-water mark of foreign jurisprudence protecting the freedom of speech,"
Justice O'Regan noted that many jurisdictions have rejected its approach,
citing decisions in Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, and Germany.'67
Justice O'Regan then engaged in careful balancing of the need for a robust
press and the preservation of other fundamental values.'68 She concluded that
requiring a plaintiff to plead and prove that a defamatory statement was false
would weigh too heavily against the fundamental value that the new South
African society places on individual human dignity.'69 Earlier in the opinion,
Justice O'Regan had stressed the paramount importance of recognizing and
protecting the dignity of every human being in order to "contradict [a] past in
which . . . black South Africans [were] routinely and cruelly denied this
right.'
170
O'Regan noted that placing the burden on the defendant to show that the
published statements were true was particularly appropriate given two
considerations. First, she stressed the difficulty attendant to plaintiffs in
proving whether a particular statement is true or false, quoting from a
dissenting opinion by Justice Stevens in which he described the many factors
that might "make it impossible for an honorable person to disprove malicious
gossip .... ,,7 In light of this difficulty, a rule either allowing plaintiffs to
prevail without demonstrating falsity or defendants to win when such proof is
not required produces, she determined, a "zero-sum result" that, no matter who
benefits, "fits uneasily with the need to establish an appropriate constitutional
balance between freedom of expression and human dignity."' 72 Second, the
law had been developed to ease the burden placed on media defendants so as
to permit them to prevail, even if a statement was false, as long as they could
' Khumalo 2002 (5) SA 401 (CC) at 422-23 (quoting Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80).
167 Id. at 423; see id. at 423 n.40.
168 Id. at 423.
169 Id. at 423-25.
171 Id. at 418 (quoting Dawood v Minister of Home Affairs & Others 2000 (3) SA 936 (CC)
at 961 (S. Afr.)).
71 Id. at 421-22 (quoting Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 785-86 (1985)
(Stevens, J., dissenting)).
171 Id. at 424.
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demonstrate that they behaved reasonably and not negligently in the way they
handled the publication.1
73
Justice O'Regan elaborated on the court's handling of this issue compared
to the way other courts had dealt with it.'74 She explained that in situations
where it was not possible to prove the truth or falsity of a statement, rather
than permitting the media to win automatically, it was preferable to allow the
newspaper to prevail, for example, by showing that publication was in the
public interest and that it had exercised appropriate caution, checking
references in accordance with prevailing norms.'75
Looking at the growth of an increasingly powerful press, Justice O'Regan
noted that democratic societies, eager to protect speech yet concerned about
the possible harm resulting from extensive media coverage, had arrived at a
balance putting greater obligations on the press than the United States.
76
"Giving them a complete carte blanche, where only malice will ground a cause
of action on the NY Times case, is actually giving the press too much power,
when they really are, as a matter of private power, very powerful."' 77 She
suggested that it is appropriate to impose obligations upon the press to
establish systems to ensure that what they publish is reasonable, arguing that
this does not diminish freedom of the press, but rather protects it from abuse.'78
She emphasized the limited reach of the principles announced by the South
African court, noting that they applied only to the institutional media easily
capable of abiding by the rules, rather than to private citizens engaged in free
speech."' Such institutions can readily set in place checks and balances
requiring adherence to the ethics of good journalism, such as having two
authorities for a proposition and giving the person involved an opportunity to
respond.
C. Liability of Government Entities for Harm Resulting from Their Agents'
Actions or Omissions
In another set of cases addressing whether the common law should be
developed in light of the new constitutional order, the court was confronted
173 See Nat 'l Media Ltd. v Bogoshi 1999 (1) BCLR 1 (SCA) (S. Afr.).
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with the question of whether the government should be held liable in tort for
harm resulting from the conduct of its agents.' 80 In Carmichele v. Minister of
Safety & Security, a woman had been severely injured by a man who, despite
the police and prosecutors' knowledge that he had a history of violence against
women, was released on bail pending his trial on a sexual assault charge.'
The lower courts had dismissed the woman's tort claim against the public
officials on the ground that they did not owe her a legal duty to protect her
from her assailant." 2 In the Constitutional Court, the plaintiff claimed that the
common law of torts must be developed to comply with the constitution's
provisions guaranteeing her rights to life, dignity, freedom, security, and
personal privacy. 3 These constitutional provisions, she asserted, required a
finding that the police and prosecutors owed her a legal duty to protect her
from the clear danger posed by her attacker.'
Before beginning their analysis under the South African Constitution,
Justices Ackermann and Goldstone referred to the controversial American
decision on a similar issue, DeShaney v. Winnebago Department of Social
Services.'85 In that case, a divided Supreme Court declined to find a duty on
the part of the Department of Social Services to take positive action to prevent
harm to a child by a father who it had reason to believe was abusive.8 6 The
South African court quoted a line from Justice Brennan's dissent: "The Court's
baseline is the absence of positive rights in the Constitution and a concomitant
suspicion of any claim that seems to depend on such rights."'87 Then the court
observed that the South African Constitution "point[ed] in the opposite
direction," incorporating a positive entrenchment of the right to life. 8 The
court went on to show that both the House of Lords and the European Court
of Human Rights had recently adopted a flexible approach to tort actions
against public authorities for failure to protect individuals from potential harm
18 The discussion of this set of cases by du Bois and Visser stresses their substantive
outcome, lauding South Africa's expansion of government liability beyond what most otherjurisdictions permit. See du Bois & Visser, supra note 29, at 652-54. My focus is primarily on
the way the justices engage with the foreign authorities to which they refer in their judgment.
181 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC) at 946-51 (S. Afr.).
8 Id. at 950-51.
Id. at 951-52.
I d. at 951-53.
"85 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
16 Id. at 196-98.
187 Carmichele 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC) at 957 (S. Afr.) (citing DeShaney v. Winnebago Dep't
of Soc. Serv., 489 U.S. at 204 (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
188 Id. at 957-58.
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by another person's criminal acts.189 The court remanded the case to the High
Court to consider the plaintiff's claim in light of all the evidence, giving due
regard to the normative value system of the new constitution. After trial, the
High Court concluded that the police and prosecutors had been negligent, that
bail would not have been granted but for their omission, and that the
negligence was the cause of the rape, justifying an award of damages.19 °
Four years later, the court was again confronted with the issue of whether
a public agency should be held liable in tort, in this case not for failure to act,
but for the ultra vires conduct of its employees. And again foreign law was
found to be, not determinative, but instructive.
In K v Minister of Safety and Security, three uniformed police officers
offered a ride home to a woman stranded in a strange neighborhood at 4 a.m.
and brutally raped her in their police car."' The Supreme Court of Appeal
held that the Minister of Safety and Security was not liable because the
officers were pursuing their own interests while on duty, and under the South
African law of delict (tort), such conduct was not imputed to the employer.'92
The court rejected arguments that common law rule should be developed in
"light of the spirit, purport and objects of the Constitution."' 93
When the plaintiff brought the case to the Constitutional Court, that court
determined that, pursuant to § 39(2), the common law of delict had to be
interpreted in light of the spirit, purport, and objects of the new constitution. 194
Giving consideration to the plaintiffs right to freedom and security of the
person, right to dignity, right to privacy, and right to substantive equality, the
court concluded that the Minister should be held vicariously liable for the
wrongful conduct of the officers. 95 In arriving at this decision, Justice
O'Regan, speaking for a unanimous court, specifically emphasized, in the
quotation provided at the beginning of this Article, the value gained from
looking at how other jurisdictions dealt with this issue.'96
The court noted that a recent House of Lords decision found the directors
of a school liable where a warden in charge of the school's hostel sexually
189 Id. at 958-59.
190 Minister of Safety & Security v Carmichele 2004 (3) SA 305 (SCA) at 326-27 (S. Aft.).
191 2005 (6) SA 419 (CC) at 423-24 (S. Aft.).
192 Id. at 425.
193 Id.
194 Id. at 428-29.
195 Id. at 442-45.
196 Id. at 437-38.
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abused boys in his charge.' 97 That court held that although the warden's
conduct was clearly a gross deviation from his employer's interests, "the
conduct itself was sufficiently closely related to the obligations borne by the
employer in respect of the children who were abused to render the employer
liable."' 9 Similarly, the Constitutional Court found helpful the Canadian
court's nuanced formulation of the proper test for vicarious liability of a non-
profit foundation operating a children's residential care facility. It examined
two cases that concerned sexual assaults of children committed by employees
while the children were within their care.'99
Looking to American law, the case with the most closely analogous facts
produced a closely divided (six to five) decision in the Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit.20 0  In that case, an off-duty officer (unarmed, out of
uniform) on his way home from a work seminar in a government vehicle raped
a woman after offering her a ride when her car was stuck in a snow drift.20 1
The majority held that under the Federal Tort Claims Act, the relationship
between the rape and the officer's government employment was simply too
remote and tenuous to be foreseeable to the employer. 22 A strong dissent
focused on the fact that he was authorized to travel in a government car,
receiving per diem and mileage and permitted to use red lights, and that he
thought it was part of his duties to offer a stranded motorist a ride.203
Asked how she "chose" to follow the dissenting opinion, rather than the
majority view in the Eighth Circuit case, Justice O'Regan again stressed that
it was the reasoning that mattered.20 4 When dealing with the factually complex
area of imposing vicarious liability on the police department for the wrongful
conduct of its officers, line-drawing can be very difficult and must be
"' Id. at 438 (citing Lister v. Hesley Hall [2002] 1 A.C. 215 (H.L.) (appeal taken from
A.C.)).
198 Id.
'" Id. Justice O'Regan noted that liability was imposed by an unanimous court in one case,
Bazley v. Curry [1999] 2 S.C.R. 534 (Can.), while in the other, in a split decision, Jacobi v.
Griffiths [ 1999] 2 S.C.R. 570 (Can.), the court found that the activities of the employer were too
tangential to the employee's wrongdoing to warrant imposing vicarious liability under the
announced test. Id. at 438-40.
200 Primeaux v. United States, 181 F.3d 876 (8th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
20 K v Minister of Safety and Security 2005 (6) SA 419 (CC) at 440 (S. Afr.) (citing
Primeaux v. United States, 181 F.3d 876 (8th Cir. 1999)).
202 Id.
203 Id. at 440-41.
204 Interview with Justice O'Regan, supra note 38.
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reasonably principled. She found it helpful to see how every legal system has
struggled with this type of line-drawing, and that most had
moved away from a sort of formalistic process of line-drawing.
In other words, if they're on duty, there will be liability, and if
they're off duty, there won't. Or, you know if they committed a
crime like rape, which could never be in the interest of the
minister, they definitely won't be liable[. Most legal systems
have moved from a formalistic] to a more nuanced understanding
of the role of police in a society." 5
Under this approach, it is not surprising that reasonable people arrive at
different conclusions given the complicated and varied factual scenarios
involved.
D. The Structure of Government: Presidential Prerogatives and Separation of
Powers
As a humanitarian gesture, having in mind the many years he had spent in
prison, President Mandela issued an order granting special remission of the
remainder of their sentences to certain categories of prisoners, including those
under eighteen and mothers of young children.20 6 A prisoner named Hugo, the
widowed father of a young child, challenged the order on the basis that it
violated the constitution's guarantee of equality.20 7 The first issue for the court
was whether the President's order could be subjected to any sort of judicial
review at all.
In considering the nature of the powers granted to the President by the
interim constitution, Justice Goldstone noted that similar powers had been, and
continue to be, exercised by heads of state in many countries. He found it
useful to survey how other countries handled the president's power to grant
pardons, particularly the issue of whether that power would be subject to
judicial review.0 8 While traditionally the exercise of prerogative powers of
monarchs had not been subject to judicial scrutiny, he observed that "over the
past two or three decades there has been a movement, in certain circumstances,
205 Id.
206 See President of the Republic of S. Aft. v Hugo 1997 (4) SA 1 (CC) at 5-6 (S. Afr.).
207 Id. at 6.
20 Id. at 6-7, 11.
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in favour of the recognition of such a review jurisdiction-and even in
countries without a written constitution containing a bill of rights. '2°9 Looking
to developments in England, New Zealand, Australia, and Canada, it appeared
that, depending on their subject matter, some prerogative powers had in fact
been found subject to judicial review.21 ° Justice Goldstone then reviewed the
history of the United States presidential pardon power in some detail,
concluding that the courts, while deferential towards the exercise of that
power, have at times tested it.211 In support of his impression that modem
constitutional states were moving towards at least somejudicial review of such
prerogative powers, Justice Goldstone observed that the German Federal
Constitutional Court rendered one of its few tied decisions on the issue of the
reviewability of the executive's pardon power, with four justices finding that
the Basic Law does not apply to acts of mercy, while four concluded that the
constitution would prohibit the arbitrary exercise of the pardon power.22
Finally, he quoted an Israeli judgment making clear that the president is, like
everyone else, subject to the provisions of the law.2 13
Justice Goldstone recalled that looking abroad was particularly helpful to
his analysis in this case. It was useful to see the reasoning behind decisions to
exercise judicial review of such executive power, or not to permit such
214
review. Similarly, although acknowledging the particular difficulties
associated with making comparisons with other jurisdictions regarding the
structure of government,21 5 Justice Ackermann nonetheless found it helpful to
look abroad in a case where a justice of the High Court2 6 had declared a
statutory provision requiring imposition of a life sentence for certain crimes,
absent "unusual and exceptional" factors, unconstitutional as violative of the
separation of powers doctrine.2"7 Addressing first the separation of powers
provision of the country's new constitution, Justice Ackermann described the
court's interpretation as one that would reflect a "distinctly South African
209 Id. at 11.
210 Id. at 12-15.
211 Id. at 15-16.
212 Id. at 16.
213 Id. at 16-17.
214 Interview with Justice Goldstone, supra note 33.
215 See supra notes 63-76 and accompanying text.
216 The High Court of South Africa, constituted in 1994, inherited the jurisdiction of the
provincial and local divisions of the Supreme Court of South Africa. See S. AFR. CONST. 1996
§ 166. The constitution provides that High Courts may decide all constitutional matters except
those specifically reserved to the Constitutional Court or other tribunals. Id. § 169.
27 SvDodo 2001 (3) SA 382 (CC) (S. Afr.).
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model. 2 Is Here, references to prior South African judgments which included
the words of Justice Felix Frankfurter 2 9 and a quotation of Professor Laurence
Tribe 22' regarding the proper interpretation of the U.S. Constitution served
generally to negate the idea that separation of powers can ever be complete and
to stress the importance of looking at the entire text of a constitution to discern
the nature of the separation that was envisaged. As such, foreign law serves
simply as a backdrop to careful analysis of what the framers of the South
African Constitution had in mind when they included a separation of powers
provision.
In the context of punishment for crimes, the court determined that both the
legislature and the courts had a role to play in deciding the appropriate
sentence in a particular case. A decision by the Appellate Division22 prior to
adoption of the constitution stating that criminal punishment is primarily
within the discretion of the trial court was found to be of little relevance given
that, without any power of review based on a justiciable Bill of Rights, the
court had no realistic alternative means of challenging legislative excesses.222
Accordingly, the Constitutional Court determined that, under the new order,
the legislature's prescription of a life sentence for serious crimes, particularly
given the discretion retained by courts to deviate from that sentence when it
was in the interests of justice,223 did not violate the separation of powers
doctrine.
The court's conclusion was reinforced by a survey of the law of the United
States, Canada, Australia, Germany, India, New Zealand, and the United
Kingdom.224 Justice Ackermann noted that in all these democracies, which
also subscribed to a version, though different in detail, of separation of powers
principles, it was permissible for the legislature to set limits to the courts'
discretion in imposing sentences.225 When asked about the court's reference
to these foreign sources, Justice Ackermann recalled quoting Professor Tribe
218 Id. at 394-95.
219 Id. at 394.
220 Id. at 395.
221 The Appellate Division was the highest court in South Africa between 1910 and 1994.
222 S vDodo 2001 (3) SA 382 (CC) at 396-97.
223 Id. at 408-09. The court noted that, according to a recent Supreme Court of Appeal
decision, this discretion, although limited, allowed trial courts to take many factors into account,
regardless of whether they diminished moral guilt, when deciding whether a reduced sentence
was appropriate. Id. at 392-93 (citing S v Malgas No. 117/2000 (SCA Mar. 19, 2001)
(unpublished opinion)).
224 Id. at 398-402.
225 Id.
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about the dangers of starting off with a theoretical idea of the separation of
powers rather than viewing it in the context of the whole constitutional
document.226 He stressed that one must be particularly careful when dealing
with structural aspects of a constitution, such as issues of federal and state
relations, because of the unique balance created by each constitutional
document.227 Even with regard to the interpretation of rights, where
comparisons with foreign authorities are generally less problematic, caution
is in order. Here, for example, when the court found that the sentence did not
violate the proscription of cruel and inhuman treatment, Justice Ackermann
noted that citation to certain cases approving sentences against claims of
disproportionality in no way signaled that the South African court agreed with
the disposition of those cases.22
E. Equality Provisions and Affirmative Action
In the final set of cases, requiring interpretation of the equality provisions
of the constitution in two quite different contexts, the South African court also
found it helpful to look abroad in analyzing the issues. In Van der Walt v
Metcash Trading Ltd.,229 the Supreme Court of Appeal had, on successive days
through two different panels, issued contrary orders in cases with identical
facts and points of law.230 In Minister of Finance v Van Heerden,23 1 a pension
fund scheme provided a lower level of employer contribution to
parliamentarians, largely white, who held office prior to 1994 than to more
recently elected parliamentarians.2 32 The losing party in each case argued that
the different treatment to which they had been subjected violated the equality
provisions of the constitution.
In his majority opinion in Van der Walt, Justice Goldstone, citing to Indian
authority,233 held that the outcome did not violate the right of equality.234 He
reasoned that inconsistent results arising from the discretion involved in
226 Interview with Justice Ackermann, supra note 48.
227 Id.
228 Id.
229 2002 (4) SA 317 (CC) (S. Afr.).
231 Id. at 321, 329 (Ngcobo, J., dissenting).
231 2004 (6) SA 121 (CC) (S. Afr.).
232 Id. at 127-29, 132 n.23.
233 Van der Walt 2002 (4) SA 317 (CC) at 326 n.22.
234 Id. at 328.
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granting appeals does not amount to unconstitutional arbitrariness.235 In his
dissenting opinion, on the other hand, Justice Ngcobo engaged in extensive
analysis of the principles involved in the case by using foreign jurisprudence
and came to the opposite conclusion.236 Unlike the majority, he found in
Indian case law a strong affirmation of the ideal of equality, specifically the
principle that similarly situated litigants should be treated equally.237 He also
looked to American jurisprudence, finding in the retroactivity cases the
conclusion that "[u]nless there is a principled reason for acting differently, the
different outcomes point to unequal treatment. ,238 In addition, he cited British
jurisprudence in support of the proposition that the Supreme Court of Appeal,
as the ultimate court of appeal in non-constitutional matters, may have the
"power to correct an injustice caused by its earlier decision., 239
Although the Van Heerden court also rejected the challenge by the
disadvantaged parliamentarians, here the justices grappled in detail with the
meaning of the South African equality provisions. After observing that the
term "equal protection" is present both in Section 9(1) of the South African
Constitution and in the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution, Justice Moseneke, writing for the majority, distinguished South
Africa's "equality jurisprudence" from that of the United States:
Our respective histories, social context and constitutional design
differ markedly.... We must therefore exercise great caution not
to import, through this route, inapt foreign equality jurisprudence
which may inflict on our nascent equality jurisprudence
American notions of 'suspect categories of State action' and of
'strict scrutiny'. The Afrikaans equivalent 'regstellende aksie' is
perhaps juridically more consonant with the remedial or
restitutionary component of our equality jurisprudence.24 °
Unlike the American requirement of strict scrutiny to justify so-called "reverse
discrimination," the South African equality provisions include a substantive
obligation to achieve "full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms" and
235 Id. at 324, 326-27.
236 See id. at 330-31 (Ngcobo, J., dissenting) (asserting that the "overlap between the rule of
law and equality... strike at arbitrariness").
237 Id. at 331-32 (Ngcobo, J., dissenting).
238 Id. at 332 & n.37 (Ngcobo, J., dissenting).
239 Id. at 336 n.46 (Ngcobo, J., dissenting).
240 MinisterofFinancev Van Heerden 2004 (6) SA 121 (CC) at 135-36 (emphasis removed).
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authorize remedial measures to attain that goal.241 Justice Moseneke explained
the term "regstellende aksie" and elaborated on this South African concept:
"Reg is to restore, to correct. Regstellende aksie is action that seeks to
ameliorate past suffering; it's restorative action. . . .So [the American
principle of] affirmative action does not do service to our notions of
equality. 242
In a concurring opinion, Justice Sachs also pointed to foreign law in
interpreting the constitutional command to "promote substantive equality and
race-conscious remedial action": "The need for such an express and firm
constitutional pronouncement becomes understandable in the light of the
enormous public controversies and divisions ofjudicial opinion on the subject
in other countries .. .[which] had become particularly pronounced in the
United States. 243 Sachs repeated a lengthy quotation from Justice Thurgood
Marshall's dissent in City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co.,2 emphasizing the
distinction between measures to enforce racism and those trying to overcome
it, before concluding that the South African Constitution "pre-empted any
judicial uncertainty on the matter by unambiguously directing courts to follow
the line of reasoning that Marshall J[.] relied on, and that the majority of the
[U.S.] Supreme Court rejected. 245
Both Justice Moseneke's majority opinion and Justice Sachs' concurring
opinion epitomize the dialogical, or analytical, approach to the use of foreign
law. Each jurist gleaned valuable insights for interpreting the South African
Constitution's equality provisions by focusing on divergent United States
jurisprudence based on a different constitutional text and history. South
Africa's equality jurisprudence is all the richer for its willingness to confront
and learn from the experience in another country.
V. CONCLUSION
Despite the undeniable and significant differences between the United
States and South Africa in terms of constitutional history, the South African
experience described here suggests that American courts may gain valuable
241 S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 9(2).
242 Interview with Deputy Chief Justice Moseneke, supra note 5.
243 Van Heerden 2004 (6) SA 121 (CC) at 173-74 (Sachs, J., concurring).
24 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (Supreme Court, by a vote of five to four, struck down a program
designed to increase the proportion of municipal contracts awarded to black contractors).
245 Van Heerden 2004 (6) SA 121 (CC) at 174 (internal footnote omitted); see City of
Richmond, 488 U.S. at 551-53 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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insights by looking abroad. When South African justices engage in this
practice, they seek ways of conceptualizing issues, and they search for possible
solutions to common questions raised by vague, and at times conflicting,
constitutional commands. Never considering foreign law to be binding, or
even persuasive apart from the cogency of its reasoning, the court avoids any
threat to its sovereignty. The justices consider only open and democratic
societies, and they are well attuned to differences among legal systems. They
try hard not to lose sight of any historical and cultural context that may reveal
reasons for differing responses to similar problems even given superficially
comparable language and settings. And far from cherry picking, they are
particularly conscientious about confronting and distinguishing contrary
authorities. Perhaps not coincidentally, courts around the world have in turn
referred increasingly to South African judgments.246 In light of the benefits
that could be derived from broadened judicial horizons, and the fact that
negative consequences can be avoided by honest and thoughtful consideration
of what one finds abroad, American courts would do well to join in the global
conversation.
246 Albie Sachs mentioned with some pride that the Court's decisions are being cited in other
parts of the world, hopefully in the same spirit. Interview with Justice Sachs, supra note 31.
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